Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade

Holger Breinlich, Volker Nocke and Nicolas Schulz

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: In a two-country international trade model with oligopolistic competition, we studythe conditions on market structure and trade costs under which a merger policy designed to benefit domestic consumers is too tough or too lenient from the viewpoint of the foreign country. Calibrating the model to match industry-level data in the U.S. and Canada, we show that at present levels of trade costs merger policy is too tough in the vast majority of sectors. We also quantify the resulting externalities and study the impact of different regimes of coordinating merger policies at varying levels of trade costs.

Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions; Merger Policy; Trade Policy; Oligopoly; International Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 L13 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-int
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25308/1/519SFB.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade (2020)
Working Paper: Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade (2018)
Working Paper: Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade (2016)
Working Paper: Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade (2016)
Working Paper: Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade (2015)
Working Paper: Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade (2015)
Working Paper: Merger policy in a quantitative model of internationaltrade (2015)
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