Classic coordination failures revisited: the effects of deviation costs and loss avoidance

Giovanna Devetag and Andreas Ortmann

No 703, CEEL Working Papers from Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia

Abstract: Are communication failures common? We revisit a classic example of experimental coordination failure and explore, in a 2x2 design, the effects of deviation costs and loss avoidance. Our results suggest how to engineer coordination successes in the laboratory, and possibly in the wild.

Keywords: coordination games; Pareto-ranked equilibria; payoff-asymmetric equilibria; optimization incentives; robustness; coordination failure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Classic coordination failures revisited: the effects of deviation costs and loss avoidance (2010)
Working Paper: Classic Coordination Failures Revisited: The Effects of Deviation Costs and Loss Avoidance (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trn:utwpce:0703

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