Cooperative Attitudes in Nonprofit Firms. Evidence from An Artefactual Field Experiment with Workers of Social Cooperatives

Luigi Mittone and Matteo Ploner

No 1101, CEEL Working Papers from Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia

Abstract: We investigate strategic choices of individuals working for social cooperatives in Italy. Specifically, a 2-players Prisoner�s Dilemma is administered as an attachment to a nationwide survey of nonprofit organizations. We experimentally manipulate social proximity of the participants and efficiency of cooperation. We show that higher efficiency of cooperation has a significant positive impact on the cooperation rate in the game, while closer social proximity does not significantly affect choices. In addition, a positive correlation between perceived organizational fairness and self�reported intrinsic motivation is identified in the sample under investigation. This finding provides stimulating insights on the interplay between organizational features and workers� motivational factors.

Keywords: Cooperation; Field Experiments; Social Dilemmas; Nonprofit Organizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trn:utwpce:1101

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