 Communication, sequentiality and strategic power. A prisoners� dilemma experimentLuigi Mittone and Andrew Musau No 1603, CEEL Working Papers from Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia Abstract: One shot two-player sequential game experiments are characterized by an asymmetry in the observed payoffs of participants. In the ultimatum game, for example, the distribution favors first-movers, whereas in the in- vestment game, it favors second movers. A comparison to sequential move games are symmetric simultaneous move games, which entail symmetry in actions and payoffs. We experimentally examine the role of first-mover anticipated communication on the inter-player strategic power dynamics that exist in a symmetric simultaneous move prisoners� dilemma, and a sequential move investment game, and show that such communication has a significant effect in inducing payoff asymmetries in symmetric games. Keywords: strategic power; communication; prisoners� dilemma; investment game; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trn:utwpce:1603 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in CEEL Working Papers from Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia Contact information at EDIRC. |
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