Competition for status creates superstars: An experiment on public good provision and network formation

Theo Offerman, Arthur Schram and Boris van Leeuwen ()

No 14-16, IAST Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST)

Abstract: We investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in a network formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player to realize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a laboratory experiment we systematically examine the effects of group size and status rents. The experimental results provide very clear support for a competition for status dynamic that predicts when, and if so which, repeated game equilibrium is reached. Two control treatments allow us to reject the possibility that the supergame effects we observe are driven by social motives.

JEL-codes: C91 D85 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Competition for Status Creates Superstars: an Experiment on Public Good Provision and Network Formation (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:iastwp:28902

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