Authority and Centrality: Power and Cooperation in Social Dilemma Networks

Abhijit Ramalingam, David Rojo Arjona, Arthur Schram and Boris van Leeuwen (b.vanleeuwen@uvt.nl)

No 15-23, IAST Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST)

Abstract: We investigate the effects of power on cooperation in repeated social dilemma settings. Groups of five players play either multi-player trust games or VCM-games on a fixed network. Power stems from having the authority to allocate funds raised through voluntary contributions by all members and/or from having a pivotal position in the network (centrality). We compare environments with and without ostracism by allowing players in some treatments to exclude others from further participation in the network. Our results show that power matters but that its effects hinge strongly on the type involved. Reminiscent of the literature on leadership, players with authority often act more cooperatively than those without such power. Nevertheless, when possible, they are quickly ostracized from the group. Thus, this kind of power is not tolerated by the powerless. In stark contrast, centrality leads to less cooperative behavior and this free riding is not punished; conditional on cooperativeness, players with power from centrality are less likely to be ostracized than those without. Hence, not only is this type of power tolerated, but so is the free riding it leads to.

Keywords: power; cooperation; networks; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D02 D03 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-net and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Authority and centrality: Power and cooperation in social dilemma networks (2015)
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