The Theoretical Shapley-Shubik Probability of an Election Inversion in a Toy Symmetric Version of the U.S. Presidential Electoral System

Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton, Dominique Lepelley and Olivier de Mouzon

No 18-78, IAST Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST)

Keywords: Electoral system; Election Inversions; Impartial Anonymous Culture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The theoretical Shapley–Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system (2020)
Working Paper: The Theoretical Shapley-Shubik Probability of an Election Inversion in a Toy Symmetric Version of the U.S. Presidential Electoral System (2020)
Working Paper: The Theoretical Shapley-Shubik Probability of an Election Inversion in a Toy Symmetric Version of the U.S. Presidential Electoral System (2018)
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