Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game

Georg Nöldeke and Jorge Peña

No 18-86, IAST Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST)

Abstract: We consider the private provision of a public good with non-refundable binary contributions. A fixed amount of the good is provided if and only if the number of contributors reaches an exogenous threshold. The threshold, the group size, and the identical cost of contributing to the public good are common knowledge. Our main result shows that the maximal probability of reaching the threshold (and thereby obtaining the public good) which can be supported in a symmetric equilibrium of this participation game is decreasing in group size. This generalizes a well-known result for the volunteer’s dilemma – in which the threshold is one – to arbitrary thresholds and thereby confirms a conjecture by Olson for the class of participation games under consideration. Further results characterize the limit when group size goes to infinity and provide conditions under which the expected number of contributors is decreasing or increasing in group size.

Keywords: Participation games; Private provision of public goods; Group-size effects; Olson conjecture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game (2020)
Working Paper: Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game (2020)
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