The Ownership of Data

Wilfried Sand-Zantman and Anastasios Dosis

No 19-1025, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We study the effects of property rights over the use of data on market outcomes. To do so, we consider a model in which a monopolistic firm offers a service to a set of heterogeneous users. The use of the service generates valuable data, but data extraction entails a privacy cost for users. A trade-off emerges between under-processing and over-monetization of data. We show that both the firm and users prefer the users (the firm) to own the rights for low (high) values of data. We further discuss the robustness of our results when allowing more possible contracts for the data owner and show that the main trade-off is robust to these extensions.

Keywords: Ownership; Data; Imperfect Competition; Privacy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 D86 L12 L19 L49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07-17, Revised 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-law and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/docu ... 2019/wp_tse_1025.pdf Full Text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Ownership of Data (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:123180

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().