Taxes and Turnout

Felix Bierbrauer, Aleh Tsyvinski and Nicolas Werquin

No 19-1050, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We develop a model of political competition with endogenous platform choices of parties and endogenous turnout. A main finding is that a party that is leading in the polls has an incentive to cater primarily to the core voters of the opposing party. A party that is lagging behind, by contrast, has an incentive to cater to its own base. We analyze the implications for redistributive taxation and characterize the political weights that competing parties assign to voters with different incomes. Finally, we relate the comparative statics predictions of our model to the asymmetric demobilization strategy in the German elections in the era of Merkel.

Keywords: Political competition; Income Taxation; Turnout. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-ore, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Taxes and Turnout (2019)
Working Paper: Taxes and Turnout (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:123701

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