Les Certificats d'Economie d'Energie entre économie et politique

Claude Crampes and Thomas-Olivier Léautier

No 21-1205, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: To encourage building renovations and the replacement of old energy-consuming equipment, some governments have introduced a system of white certificates requiring large producers and distributors of natural gas, electricity and fuel to prove that they have financed energy-saving operations. The system is proving to be much less efficient than expected because energy saving works are "credence goods", which means that their quality can be correctly measured neither before nor after their achievement. Because of this informational bias, white certificates encourage economically inefficient works. Despite this, they are favored by the public authorities because they belong to the panoply of nonpunitive, non-fiscal, decentralized and local job-creating micro-policies.

JEL-codes: D13 D82 L97 Q48 Q51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-04-14, Revised 2022-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene
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Related works:
Journal Article: Les certificats d’économie d’énergie entre économie et politique (2023)
Working Paper: Les Certificats d'Economie d'Energie entre économie et politique (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:125523

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