Modeling optimal quarantines with waning immunity
Aditya Goenka,
Lin Liu and
Manh Hung Nguyen
No 21-1206, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Abstract:
This paper studies continuing optimal lockdowns (can also be interpreted as quaran-tines or self-isolation) in the long run if a disease (Covid-19) is endemic and immunity can fail, that is, the disease has SIRS dynamics. We model how disease related mor-tality affects the optimal choices in a dynamic general equilibrium neoclassical growth framework. An extended welfare function that incorporates loss from mortality is used. In a disease endemic steady state, without this welfare loss even if there is continu-ing mortality, it is not optimal to impose even a partial lockdown. We characterize how the optimal restriction and equilibrium outcomes vary with the effectiveness of the lockdown, the productivity of working from home, the rate of mortality from the disease, and failure of immunity. We provide the sufficiency conditions for economic models with SIRS dynamics with disease related mortality – a class of models which are non-convex and have endogenous discounting so that no existing results are applicable.
JEL-codes: C61 D15 D50 D63 E13 E22 I10 I15 I18 O41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-05-04, Revised 2022-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/docu ... 2021/wp_tse_1206.pdf Full Text (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Modeling optimal quarantines with waning immunity (2021) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:125549
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().