Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval

Jérôme Renault and Françoise Forges

No 21-1216, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender’s approval is crucial to the receiver. We show that a partitional, (perfect Bayesian Nash) equilibrium exists if the sender has only two types or if the receiver’s preferences over decisions do not depend on the type of the sender as long as the latter participates. The result does not extend: we construct a counter-example (with three types for the sender and type-dependent affine utility functions) in which there is no mixed equilibrium. In the three type case, we provide a full characterization of (possibly mediated) equilibria.

JEL-codes: C C7 C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:125607

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