Static and Dynamic Mirrleesian Taxation with Non-separable Preferences: A Unified Approach

Christian Hellwig

No 21-1224, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: I analyze dynamic Mirrlees taxation with preferences that are non-separable between con- sumption, leisure and type, which determines both ability and consumption needs. I show how to account for non-separable preferences through a simple change in probability measures. I ge- neralize the existing Inverse Euler Equation and optimal static labor tax formulae and provide a unied intuition based on a set of perturbations around the optimal allocations that preserve expected utility and incentive compatibility. Non-separability in preferences gives rise to a new tradeo between current and future redistribution that is internalized by the planner's solution but not by private savings decisions. This leads to a novel rationale to subsidize (tax) savings and make labor taxes more (less) persistent, when more productive agents also have higher (lower) consumption needs.

Date: 2021-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-upt
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Working Paper: Static and Dynamic Mirrleesian Taxation with Non-separable Preferences: A Unified Approach (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:125745

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