The impact of competition on expert's information disclosure: the case of real estate brokers

Frédéric Cherbonnier and Christophe Lévêque

No 21-1255, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: Competition can theoretically counter or reinforce tendency of experts to pass biased information to customers. Using data from an online company connecting real estate brokers with clients who want to sell their properties, we show that more competition or lower opportunity to collude induce brokers to raise their ini- tial price estimation by more than 3%. This is observed upstream, when experts appraise the property for sale. Competition partially prevents brokers from biais- ing downward evaluations, and is benecial to the client since it translates into a positive eect on listing and sale prices with no signicant eect on the time to sale.

Keywords: Information revelation; Competition; Price appraisal; Real Estate Bro-; kers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 L15 L85 R30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-10-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-reg and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:126130

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