Splitting games over finite sets

Frederic Koessler, Marie Laclau (), Jérôme Renault and Tristan Tomala

No 22-1321, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: This paper studies zero-sum splitting games with finite sets of states. Players dynamically choose a pair of martingales {pt,qt}t, in order to control a terminal payoff u(p∞,q∞). A firstpartintroduces the notion of “Mertens-Zamir transform” of a real-valued matrix and use it to approximate the solution of the Mertens-Zamir system for continuous functions on the square [0, 1]2. A second part considers the general case of finite splitting games with arbitrary correspondences containing the Dirac mass on the current state: building on Laraki and Renault (2020), we show that the value exists by constructing non Markovian ε-optimal strategies and we characterize it as the unique concave-convex function satisfying two new conditions.

Date: 2022-03-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-gth
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Related works:
Working Paper: Splitting games over finite sets (2024)
Working Paper: Splitting games over finite sets (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:126754

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