Regulating Platform Fees under Price Parity

Renato Gomes and Andrea Mantovani

No 22-1325, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: Online intermediaries greatly expand consumer information, but also raise sellers’ marginal costs by charging high commissions. To prevent disintermediation, some platforms adopted price parity and anti-steering provisions, which restrict sellers’ ability to use alternative sales channels. Whether to uphold, reform, or ban these provisions has been at the center of the policy debate, but, so far, little consensus has emerged. As an alternative, this paper studies how to cap platforms’ commissions. The utilitarian cap reflects the Pigouvian precept according to which the platform should charge net fees no greater than the informational externality it exerts on other market participants.

Keywords: platforms, price parity; regulation; commission caps; extreme value theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 L10 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-03-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic, nep-pay and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Regulating Platform Fees under Price Parity (2022)
Working Paper: Regulating Platform Fees under Price Parity (2020)
Working Paper: Regulating Platform Fees under Price Parity (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:126835

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