Personalized Pricing and Competition

Andrew Rhodes and Jidong Zhou ()

No 22-1333, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We study personalized pricing in a general oligopoly model. The impact of personalized pricing relative to uniform pricing hinges on the degree of market coverage. If market conditions are such that coverage is high (e.g., the production cost is low, or the number of firms is high), personalized pricing harms firms and benefits consumers, whereas the opposite is true if coverage is low. When only some firms have data to personalize prices, consumers can be worse off compared to when either all or no firms personalize prices.

Keywords: personalized pricing; competition; price discrimination; consumer data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D82 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-05-09, Revised 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cta, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/docu ... 2022/wp_tse_1333.pdf Full Text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Personalized Pricing and Competition (2022)
Working Paper: Personalized Pricing and Competition (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:126889

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().