Motivating Public Sector Employees: Public Good Contributions in Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority

Josepa Miquel-Florensa, George Joseph, Sanjay Pahuja, Tewodros Tebekew and Yi Rong Hoo

No 22-1336, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We present a lab-in-the-field experiment with employees of the Addis Ababa Water and Sanitation Authority to understand how to improve co-ordination and collaboration in their daily work. Participants play a series of public good games under different rules: a standard game, a game with a threshold, and a game with a randomly selected anonymous monitor with the power to punish. We show that a common goal, in the form of a thresh-old to be attained for the group’s success, is significantly more effective than a potentially punishing monitor for increasing individual effort and, ultimately, group outcomes (conditional on the threshold being attained).

JEL-codes: J45 M50 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-05-20, Revised 2024-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:126939

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