Platform Liability and Innovation

Doh-Shin Jeon, Yassine Lefouili and Leonardo Madio

No 22-1361, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We study a platform's incentives to delist IP-infringing products and the effects of holding the platform liable for the presence of such products on innovation and consumer welfare. For a given number of buyers, platform liability increases innovation by reducing the competitive pressure faced by innovators. However, there can be a misalignment of interests between innovators and buyers. Furthermore, platform liability can have unintended consequences, which overturn the intended effect on innovation. Platform liability tends to increase (decrease) innovation and consumer welfare if the elasticity of participation of innovators is high (low) and that of buyers is low (high).

Keywords: Platform; Liability; Intellectual Property; Innovation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K13 K40 K42 L13 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-09-19, Revised 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-law, nep-mic, nep-pay, nep-reg and nep-tid
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Related works:
Working Paper: Platform Liability and Innovation (2022)
Working Paper: Platform Liability and Innovation (2022)
Working Paper: Platform Liability and Innovation (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:127344

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