Equilibrium (non-)Existence in Games with Competing Principals

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenaël Piaser

No 22-1364, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We study competing-mechanism games, in which multiple principals contract with multiple agents. We reconsider the issue of non-existence of an equilibrium as first raised by Myerson (1982). In the context of his example, we establish the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We clarify that Myerson (1982)’s non-existence result is an implication of the additional requirement he imposes, that each principal selects his preferred continuation equilibrium in the agents’ game.

Keywords: Competing Mechanisms; Equilibrium Existence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-09-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals (2023)
Working Paper: Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals (2023)
Working Paper: Equilibrium (non-)Existence in Games with Competing Principals (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:127377

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