The privatization-corruption relationship is nonlinear: Evidence from 1985-2022 data on telecommunications in 103 countries

Farid Gasmi, Isacco Berté, Louise Demoury, Dorgyles Kouakou, Niklas Patzig and Laura Recuero Virto

No 24-1523, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: Using data on telecommunications from 1985 to 2022 in 103 countries, this article provides evidence of a robust nonlinear relationship between privatization and corruption showing that the latter has an inverted U-shape effect on the former. Using the Bayesian Corruption Index as a proxy for corruption, we find that the threshold beyond which higher levels of corruption do no longer foster privatization is slightly above 50% of the maximum value of this index. The complexity of the relationship between privatization and corruption points to the need to develop sophisticated strategies to effectively combat corruption, the negative effects of which on social welfare have been widely discussed in the literature.

Keywords: Privatization; Corruption; Telecommunications; Nonlinearity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 L33 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:129283

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