Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study

André Blais, Jean-François Laslier, Nicolas Sauger and Karine Van der Straeten ()

No 09-065, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections, but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics (in two-round elections) or they just vote sincerely (in single transferable vote elections).

Date: 2009-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study (2010)
Working Paper: Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:21952

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