Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process

David Martimort, Jean-Christophe Poudou and Wilfried Sand-Zantman

No 09-053, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We analyze the contract between an innovator and a developer, when the former has private information on his idea and the latter must exert efforts but may also quit the relationship after having been informed. We show that the equilibrium contracts distort downwards the developer's incentives but in different ways according to the strength of intellectual property rights (IPR). For example, with intermediate IPR, only pooling contracts arise with a limited amount of information revealed.

Date: 2009-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cta, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:21957

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