Arm's length relationships without moral hazard

Jacques Crémer ()

No 09-111, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: I show that cutting the flow of information between a principal and an agent can increase the power of the incentives of the agent to reveal private information.

Date: 2009-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/io/wp_io_111_2009.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Arm's-Length Relationships without Moral Hazard (2010)
Working Paper: Arm's length relationships without moral hazard (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:21974

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().