Optimal Transport and Cournot-Nash Equilibria

Adrien Blanchet and Guillaume Carlier

No 12-321, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We study a class of games with a continuum of players for which Cournot-Nash equilibria can be obtained by the minimisation of some cost, related to optimal transport. This cost is not convex in the usual sense in general but it turns out to have hidden strict convexity properties in many relevant cases. This enables us to obtain new uniqueness results and a characterisation of equilibria in terms of some partial differential equations, a simple numerical scheme in dimension one as well as an analysis of the inefficiency of equilibria.

Keywords: Cournot-Nash equilibria; mean-field games; optimal transport; externalities; Monge-Amp`ere equations; convexity along generalised geodesics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-tre and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:26030

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