Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data

Bruno Jullien and Wilfried Sand-Zantman

No 12-327, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We consider zero-rating by Internet service providers. We analyze the implications of offering sponsored data plans that allow content providers to pay for traffic on behalf of their consumers. These plans boost consumption of high-value content and decrease the networks'incentives to exclude low-value content. The welfare effect of allowing this price discrimination depends on the proportion of content targeted and the value of contents. Our analysis is extended to various cases (one-sided pricing, competing network, heterogenous cost, paid contents).

JEL-codes: D82 D83 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06, Revised 2017-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-net and nep-tre
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Internet regulation, two-sided pricing, and sponsored data (2018)
Working Paper: Internet regulation, two-sided pricing, and sponsored data (2018)
Working Paper: Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:26061

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