A Competitive Approach to Leadership in Public Good Games

Samuele Centorrino and Laura Concina

No 13-383, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We show that introducing a competitive preliminary stage in a sequential public good game helps select one of the more cooperative leaders in the group. Using a modified second price auction, we find that bids have a strong positive predictive power on individual contributions. Moreover, evidence is provided that trust can explain voluntary and cooperative leadership. However, followers reaction to voluntary leaders may rise free riding behaviour, with uncertain effect on total public good provision.

Keywords: Public; good; experiment; Leadership; Self-selection; Cooperation; Trust; Public; good; provision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C72 C92 H41 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:26933

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