Competition and the Hold‐U p Problem: a Setting with Non‐exclusive Contracts

Guillem Roig

No 14-481, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: This work studies how the introduction of competition to the side of the market offering trading contracts affects the equilibrium investment profile in a bilateral investment game. By using a common agency framework, where contracts are not exclusive, we find that the equilibrium investment profile depends on the competitiveness of the equilibrium outcome. Full efficiency can only be implemented when the trading outcome is the most competitive. Moreover, lowering the outcome competitiveness is not always Pareto dominant for the parties offering the contracts, and larger social welfare can be obtained with low competitive equilibria.

Keywords: bilateral investment; hold-up; competition; Pareto dominance; social surplus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/io/wp_tse_481.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:28042

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().