Cross-Licensing and Competition

Doh-Shin Jeon and Yassine Lefouili

No 15-577, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We analyze the competitive effects of bilateral cross-licensing agreements in a setting with many competing firms. We show that firms can sustain the monopoly outcome if they can sign unconstrained bilateral cross-licensing contracts. This result is robust to increasing the number of firms who can enter into a cross-licensing agreement. We also investigate the scenario in which a cross-licensing contract cannot involve the payment of a royalty by a licensee who decides ex post not to use the licensed technology. Finally, policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross-licensing agreements are derived.

Keywords: Cross-Licensing; Royalties; Collusion; Antitrust and Intellectual Property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L24 L41 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05, Revised 2017-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Cross‐licensing and competition (2018)
Working Paper: Cross-Licensing and competition (2018)
Working Paper: Cross-Licensing and Competition (2015)
Working Paper: Cross-Licensing and Competition (2015)
Working Paper: Cross-Licensing and Competition (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:29317

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