On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenaël Piaser

No 15-609, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We study games in which several principals design incentive schemes in the presence of privately informed agents. Competition is exclusive: each agent can participate with at most one principal, and principal-agents corporations are isolated. We analyze the role of standard incentive compatible mechanisms in these contexts. First, we provide a clarifying example showing how incentive compatible mechanisms fail to completely characterize equilibrium outcomes even if we restrict to pure strategy equilibria. Second, we show that truth-telling equilibria are robust against unilateral deviations toward arbitrary mechanisms. We then consider the single agent case and exhibit sufficient conditions for the validity of the revelation principle.

Keywords: Competing Mechanisms; Exclusive Competition; Incomplete Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/docum ... /2015/wp_tse_609.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition (2018)
Working Paper: On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition (2018)
Working Paper: On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition (2018)
Working Paper: On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:29906

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().