The Condorcet Principle Implies the Proxy Voting Paradox

Michel Le Breton

No 16-619, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: In this note, we formulate a condition describing the vulnerability of a social choice function to a specific kind of strategic behavior and show that two well known classes of choice functions suffer from it.

Keywords: Condorcet; Departing Voter Paradox; Backward Induction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/docum ... /2016/wp_tse_619.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
http://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2016/figures.pdf Appendix (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:30129

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().