A Note on Lobbying a Legislature

Vera Zaporozhets

No 16-673, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We study a simple in?uence game, in which a lobby tries to manipulate the decision of a legislature via monetary offers to one or more members. We compute the minimum budget needed for the lobby to pass the bill and the distribution of this budget between the legislators. We also show the connection of the problem to the combinatorial optimization.

Keywords: Legislative lobbying; Combinatorial optimization; Knapsack problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:30553

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