Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency

Fuhito Kojima and Takuro Yamashita

No 16-677, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and multi-unit demand and supply. We propose a new mechanism which satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, non-wastefulness, and no budget deficit. Moreover, this mechanism is asymptotically efficient in that the trade outcome in the mechanism converges to the efficient level as in a competitive equilibrium as the numbers of the buyers and sellers become large. Our mechanism is the first double auction mechanism with these properties in the interdependent values setting.

Keywords: double auction; interdependent values; multi-unit demand and supply; ex post incentive compatibility; asymptotic efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/docu ... /2016/wp_tse_677.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:30563

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().