Invalid but infringed? An analysis of the bifurcated patent litigation system

Katrin Cremers (), Fabian Gaessler, Dietmar Harhoff (), Christian Helmers () and Yassine Lefouili

No 16-698, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: In bifurcated patent litigation systems, claims of infringement and validity of a patent are decided independently of each other in separate court proceedings at different courts. In non-bifurcated systems, infringement and validity are decided jointly in the same proceedings at a single court. We build a model that shows the key trade-off between bifurcated and non-bifurcated systems and how it affects the incentives of plaintiffs and defendants in patent infringement cases. Using detailed data on patent litigation cases in Germany (bifurcated) and the U.K. (non-bifurcated), we show that bifurcation creates situations in which a patent is held infringed that is subsequently invalidated. We also show that having to challenge a patent’s validity in separate court proceedings under bifurcation implies that alleged infringers are less likely to do so. We find this to apply in particular to more resource-constrained alleged infringers. Finally, we find parties to be more likely to settle in a bifurcated system.

Keywords: Litigation; patents; bifurcation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Journal Article: Invalid but infringed? An analysis of the bifurcated patent litigation system (2016)
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