Risky Rents

Jean-Daniel Guigou, Bruno Lovat and Nicolas Treich

No 16-710, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: In this paper, we consider a symmetric contest game in which agents compete to increase their share of a risky rent. We show that a symmetric equilibrium always exists, and that it is unique under constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion. We then exhibit interpretable conditions so that increases in risk and risk aversion decrease equilibrium e§orts in this strategic game

Date: 2016-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Journal Article: Risky rents (2017)
Working Paper: Risky rents (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:31097

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