The Value of Revolving Doors in Public Procurement

Klenio Barbosa and Stéphane Straub

No 17-873, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We investigate the impact of revolving door on public procurement outcomes, combining 10 years of Brazilian health procurement data with a comprehensive employer-employee dataset tracking individuals’ job trajectories. We identify how movements between public administrations and private providers affect total contracting amounts and acquisition prices. Analyzing career changes in both directions, we uncover positive and negative effects, consistent respectively with reward for high-skill workers’ competence, and collusive behavior. Administration-to-supplier movements appear beneficial to public bodies, while supplier-to-administration ones are detrimental. This points to unexpected policy implications related to the tolerance of revolving door practices.

Keywords: Revolving doors; Procurement; Public Officials Career Path; Personnel Economics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H11 H57 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-12, Revised 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:32283

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