Competition For Versus In the Market of Long-Distance Passenger Rail Services

Frédéric Cherbonnier, Marc Ivaldi, Catherine Muller-Vibes and Karine Van der Straeten ()

No 18-901, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: This paper is aimed at evaluating the net gains and trade-offs at stake in implementing the competition of the rail mode in the long distance passenger market either by means of franchise or by an open access mechanism. We simulate the outcomes of competition in and for the market using a differentiated-products oligopoly model allowing for inter- and intra-modal competition in a long distance passenger market. Specifically we first calibrate the model using data describing high speed lines in France and show that the incumbent railway operator’s strategy does not simply boil down to a short-term profit maximization (e.g., because of existing regulation or limit-pricing strategy). This yields two important results when simulating competition. First, whether it is for or in the market, the opening to competition does not guarantee a decrease in prices in favor of passengers. Second, the effects of opening up to competition for the market are relatively predictable and potentially positive, while those of opening up to competition in the market remain very uncertain.

Keywords: Intermodal competition; Oligopoly model; Open access (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L90 R40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-03, Revised 2018-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-reg and nep-tre
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Journal Article: Competition For Versus In the Market of Long-Distance Passenger Rail Services (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:32558

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