How is disaster aid allocated within poor villages?

Yoshito Takasaki

Tsukuba Economics Working Papers from Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba

Abstract: How disaster aid is allocated within poor villages is little understood. This paper examines risk-sharing institutions and social hierarchies as village self-allocation mechanisms. Original survey data from Fiji contain rich information about cyclone damage, traditional kin status, and aid allocations over post-disaster phases, at both household and kin-group levels. The paper shows under what conditions the performance of targeting aid to victims can significantly differ from overall risk-sharing outcomes determined by private transfers and aid (i.e., targeting gap). Elite domination can occur not only in aid allocation independent of damage, but also in targeting on damage (i.e., targeting bias).

Date: 2011-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
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Working Paper: How is disaster aid allocated within poor villages? (2012)
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