Cursed Resources? Political Conditions and Oil Market Outcomes

Gilbert Metcalf and Catherine Wolfram

No 758, Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University from Department of Economics, Tufts University

Abstract: We analyze how a country's political institutions affect oil production within its borders. We find a pronounced negative relationship between political openness and volatility in oil production, with democratic regimes exhibiting less volatility than more autocratic regimes. This relationship holds across a number of robustness checks including using different measures of political conditions, instrumenting for political conditions and using several measures of production volatility. Political openness also affects other oil market outcomes, including total production as a share of reserves. Our findings have implications both for interpreting the role of institutions in explaining differences in macroeconomic development and for understanding world oil markets.

Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-ene and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Cursed Resources? Political Conditions and Oil Market Outcomes (2016)
Journal Article: Cursed Resources? Political Conditions and Oil Market Outcomes (2015)
Journal Article: Cursed Resources? Political Conditions and Oil Market Outcomes (2015)
Working Paper: Cursed Resources? Political Conditions and Oil Market Outcomes (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tuf:tuftec:0758

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