The Effect of Contracting Out Low Performing Schools on Student Performance

Whitney Ruble ()
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Whitney Ruble: Department of Economics, Tulane University

No 1521, Working Papers from Tulane University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Proponents of charter schools and portfolio management models argue that contracting out entire schools to management organizations can improve student performance and decrease costs by giving schools autonomy in exchange for accountability. Little evidence exists, however, on whether contracting is an effective policy in education. In New Orleans, most of the public schools have been contracted out to nonprofit management organizations over the past ten years (referred to as district to charter or D2C). Several of those contracts have been terminated and schools are then contracted out to new management organizations (charter to charter or C2C). This study uses difference-in-differences to analyze the effect that D2Cs and C2Cs have on students. The results indicate that student test scores increase by the second year after both D2Cs and C2Cs. The scores increase even sooner, after only one year for C2Cs. However, if failing schools are closed instead of being contracted out, students do not experience any change in test scores.

Keywords: low-performing schools; school quality; school closures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H40 I21 I24 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://repec.tulane.edu/RePEc/pdf/tul1521.pdf First Version, October 2015 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tul:wpaper:1521

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