Social Metacognition: A Correlational Device for Strategic Interactions

Chiara Scarampi (), Richard Fairchild (), Luca Fumarco, Alberto Palermo () and Neal Hinvest ()
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Chiara Scarampi: University of Geneva
Richard Fairchild: University of Bath
Alberto Palermo: Trier University
Neal Hinvest: University of Bath

No 2111, Working Papers from Tulane University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This study reports a laboratory experiment wherein we investigate the role of social metacognition– i.e., the ability to monitor and control one’s own and others’ mental states – in a chicken game. In the first part of the experiment, we try to implement a correlated equilibrium, a generalisation of the Nash equilibrium where players’ strategies are correlated by a third party/mechanism/choreographer. We find that social metacognition is a signif- icant predictor of subjects’ strategy choices. The experiment proceeds without third party recommendations. We find evidence that subjects with high social metacognition are more likely to play a correlated equilibrium; that is, social metacognition acts “as if” it is the correlating mechanism. We relate our findings to the individual social metacognitive ability as well as to the group composition.

Keywords: Correlated Equilibrium; Social Metacognition; Experimental Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-neu
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http://repec.tulane.edu/RePEc/pdf/tul2111.pdf First Version, June 2021 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tul:wpaper:2111

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