Rent-seeking contests with private values and common knowledge about the mean

Andrea Gallice

No 23, Working papers from Department of Economics, Social Studies, Applied Mathematics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino

Abstract: We study a rent-seeking contest in which players have heterogeneous and private valuations. In addition to their own type, agents only know that all valuations are drawn from a distribution, of which they only know the mean. We obtain a closed-form solution for agents' optimal level of investment and subject it to comparative statics analysis. We also investigate the issue of entry in the game and the amount of rent dissipation that results in equilibrium. Finally, we compare our results with those that would emerge in a context of perfect information.

Keywords: rent-seeking; contests; private information; imperfect information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2013-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.bemservizi.unito.it/repec/tur/wpapnw/m23.pdf First version, 2013 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tur:wpapnw:023

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working papers from Department of Economics, Social Studies, Applied Mathematics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Daniele Pennesi ().