The opposite Cycles of Laws and Decrees

Francesco Lagona, Antonello Maruotti and Fabio Padovano
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Francesco Lagona: DIPES, University Roma Tre, Italy

Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS from Condorcet Center for political Economy

Abstract: The present study aims to test Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) hypothesis that lower-income individuals vote for candidates who favor higher taxes and more redistribution. Assuming that left-wing parties advocate a general increase in taxation, we estimate a vote function for the French Cantonal elections. We show clear-cut evidence that an increasing proportion of voters receiving social assistance raises the number of votes in favor of left-wing parties. This result highlights the importance of including redistribution aspects when estimating a vote function.

Keywords: Economic; theory; of; legislation; -; Multilevel; models; -; Poisson; regression; -; Political; legislation; cycle; -; Random; effects; -; Voters; -; Special; interest; groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C49 H61 H62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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