Cheat or Perish? A Theory of Scientific Customs

Benoît Le Maux, Sarah Necker and Yvon Rocaboy

Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS from Condorcet Center for political Economy

Abstract: We develop a theory of the evolution of scientific misbehavior. Our empirical analysis of a survey of scientific misbehavior in economics suggests that researchers’ disutility from cheating varies with the expected fraction of colleagues who cheat. This observation is central to our theory. We develop a one-principal multi-agent framework in which a research institution aims to reward scientific productivity at minimum cost. As the social norm is determined endogenously, performance-related pay may not only increase cheating in the short run but can also make cheat-ing increasingly attractive in the long run. The optimal contract thus depends on the dynamics of scientific norms. The premium on scientific productivity should be higher when the transmission of scientific norms across generations is lower (low marginal peer pressure) or the principal cares little about the future (has a high discount rate). Under certain conditions, a greater probability of detection also increases the optimal productivity premium.

Keywords: Economics of Science; Contract Theory; Scientific Misbehavior; Social Norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A11 A13 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-evo, nep-hpe, nep-law, nep-mic, nep-soc and nep-sog
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Cheat or perish? A theory of scientific customs (2019)
Working Paper: Cheat or perish? A theory of scientific customs (2019)
Working Paper: Cheat or Perish? A Theory of Scientific Customs (2016)
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