Nash equilibria in nonsymmetric singleton congestion games with exact partition

Abderrahmane Ziad, Samir Sbabou and Hatem Smaoui
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Samir Sbabou: University of Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM (UMR CNRS)
Hatem Smaoui: CEMOI, Université de la Réunion

Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) from Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS

Abstract: We define a new class of games, which we qualify as congestion games with exact partition. These games constitute a subfamily of singleton congestion games for which the players are restricted to choose only one strategy, but they each possess their own utility function. The aim of this paper is to develop a method leading to an easier identification of all Nash equilibria in this kind of congestion games. We also give a new proof establishing the existence of a Nash equilibrium in this type of games without invoking the potential function or the finite best-reply property.

Keywords: Singleton congestion games; Nash equilibria; Potential function; Finite best-reply property. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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