On Partial Honesty Nash Implementation

Ahmed Doghmi () and Abderrahmane Ziad

Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) from Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS

Abstract: An agent is said to be partially honest if he or she weakly prefers an outcome at a strategy profile with his truthful strategy than an outcome at a strategy profile with his false strategy, then this player must prefer strictly the \tru?? strategy profille to the \fals?? strategy profile. In this paper we consider an exchange economy with single peaked preferences. With many agents (n =3), if there exists at least one partially honest agent, we prove that any solution of the problem of fair division satisfying unanimity is Nash implementable.

Keywords: Nash implementation; Partial honesty; Single-peaked preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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