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The Free Solidarity Value

Bourheneddine Ben Dhaou and Abderrahmane Ziad
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Bourheneddine Ben Dhaou: CREM, UMR CNRS 6211, Normandy University, University of Caen Basse-Normandie
Abderrahmane Ziad: CREM, UMR CNRS 6211, Normandy University, University of Caen Basse-Normandie

Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) from Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS

Abstract: In this paper, we consider a cooperative game in which two types of players co-exist: solidary and non solidary players. Solidary players are able to support by consent at least one of their weaker partners without disadvantaging non-solidary players. We present a value of the game which takes ito account the types of players and satisfies some appropriate axioms: Efficiency, Additivity, Symmetry among players who have the same type, Conditional null player, and a new axiom, the Unaffected Allocation of nonsolidary players - (UA) - which is defined as follows: when players have the possibility to decide freely to be solidary, this should affect neither the allocations of non-solidary players, nor the outcome of the game.

Keywords: Shapley value; Nowak and Radzik value; the free solidarity value; TU cooperative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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