Free Solidarity Value

Ben Dhaou Bourheneddine and Abderrahmane Ziad
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Ben Dhaou Bourheneddine: CNRS, CREM - UNICAEN - University of Caen Normandy - NU - Normandy University, France, Esplanade de Paix 14032 Caen FRANCE.

Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) from Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS

Abstract: The paper proposes a solution for TU cooperative games in which solidary and non-solidary players coexist. The distinction between the two groups is that solidary players are able to support by consent at least one of their weaker partners, without disadvantaging non-solidary players. A value for games which takes into account the types of the players and satisfies some usual axioms is presented: Efficiency, Additivity, Symmetry among players who have the same type, Conditional null player, and a new axiom, the Unaffected Allocation of non-solidary players – (UA) – which is defined as follows: when players have the possibility of deciding freely in favor of solidarity, this should affect neither the allocations of non-solidary players nor the outcome of the game.

Keywords: Shapley Value; Nowak and Radzik value; the Free solidarity value; TU cooperative games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger and nep-gth
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