Student Selection and Incentives

Gerald Eisenkopf

No 42, TWI Research Paper Series from Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz

Abstract: The paper discusses the impact of performance based selection in secondary education on student incentives. The theoretical approach combines human capital theory with signaling theory. The consideration of signaling offers an explanation for observed performance of educational systems with a standard peer effect argument. More specifically it can be optimal to select students according to ability even if selective systems do not outperform comprehensive systems in tests. Selection achieves the same output with lower private costs for the students. The paper questions the strong focus on educational tests to measure the efficiency of selective systems as long as these tests provide no information about a student�s incentives and private costs.

Keywords: Education; signalling; selection; ability grouping; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-edu and nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:twi:respas:0042

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